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A SHATTERED LOOKING GLASS:
THE PITFALLS AND POTENTIAL OF THE MOSAIC THEORY OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
David Gray * & Danielle Keats Citron **
On January 23, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark
non-decision in United States v. Jones. In that case, officers used
a GPS-enabled device to track a suspect’s public movements for
four weeks, amassing a considerable amount of data in the
process. Although ultimately resolved on narrow grounds, five
Justices joined concurring opinions in Jones expressing sympathy
for some version of the “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment
privacy.
This theory holds that we maintain reasonable
expectations of privacy in certain quantities of information even if
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we do not have such expectations in the constituent parts. This
Article examines and explores the mosaic theory. This Article
concludes that the mosaic theory exposes an important quantitative
dimension of Fourth Amendment privacy but raises serious
practical challenges, which, as argued elsewhere, can be met by
regulating surveillance technologies capable of facilitating broad
programs of indiscriminate surveillance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the first etchings of the ancients, integrity and
authenticity have stood as pillars of ethics. Whether inspired by
religious faith or deontological reflection, the very concepts of a
good life and a life well-lived imply the pursuit of some measure
of coherency, consistency, and self-possession. This search for
order is distinguished from the otherwise fragmented moments,
contexts, and pursuits that occupy our existences. From a
phenomenological point of view, this amounts to a tautology.
After all, the notion of the self is tied to persistence of identity
through time and space. 1
Beyond questions of description and definition, however, lie
more compelling questions of freedom, liberty, dominance, and
oppression. Although it is a necessary condition of liberty,
persistence of identity through time is hardly sufficient to secure
liberty. In fact, it is a point of vulnerability. What better marker of
oppression could we imagine than using disciplinary structures to
occupy and control experiences, places, and activities in order to
shape and construct the identities and lives of subjects?
Some have argued that even a fully constructed self is “free” in
the sense that conduct is neither coerced nor compelled against
one’s will. 2 But this account of freedom is far too thin to
accommodate American conceptions of liberty. When we declare

1

See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 226–27
(T. Tegg and Son, 27th ed. 1836) (1690).
2
See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 271 (1969).
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the inalienable right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” 3
we mean more than mere freedom from external constraint. We
herald both the right to define for ourselves what that good life
entails and to pursue it free from unreasonable constraint. In this
thicker, ethical sense, to be free is to pursue a lifelong process of
self-understanding and self-development. A state committed to
securing this brand of liberty for its citizens must therefore do
more than merely protect individuals from situational coercion; it
must secure the space needed to become and to be. In keeping
with our commitments to this brand of liberty, we provide broad
constitutional protections for freedom of speech, conscience, and
religion.
Understood as the conditions necessary to our projects of
ethical self-construction, freedom and liberty naturally entail
privacy. Observation and surveillance are mainstays for programs
of discipline and constraint. Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon
provides the most ready trope, 4 but, as Michel Foucault has
documented, surveillance, and the ambient possibility of
surveillance, play central roles in a wide range of institutions—
such as prisons, schools, and mental institutions—that are designed
to constrain and construct their subjects. 5 In the proper context,
and subject to appropriate controls, these tools of constitutive
observation play an important and necessary social role. Plato’s
famous parable of the Ring of Gyges paints a vivid picture of the
alternative, showing us the deleterious effects of absolute
anonymity on behavior and character. 6 Because it leads to
3

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON: OR THE INSPECTION HOUSE
(1791) (stating that a Panopticon is a rotunda in which the observers are situated
in the center and the observed occupy the outer area, allowing a small number of
observers to watch over a large number of subjects).
5
See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 195–210 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977)
(explaining how prisons use both surveillance and the threat of surveillance to
modify prisoner conduct and consciousness).
6
Plato, Republic: Book II, in FIVE GREAT DIALOGUES 253, 484 (Louise
Ropes Loomis ed., B. Jowett trans., 1942). The parable is as follows:
4
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conformity with rules and norms, 7 surveillance is, in this sense, a
necessary condition of self and society, and therefore liberty as
well. Thus, in the United Kingdom, which monitors various
locations using a sizeable closed-circuit television program, the
House of Lords found that the constant surveillance made people
feel more “safe,” even when the program showed “mixed results”
in crime detection and prevention. 8 At the same time, surveillance
can also be a tool of oppression. That is why programs of broad
and indiscriminate surveillance are frequent hallmarks of
tyrannical regimes, both real and fictitious. 9
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings [allowing the wearer to
become invisible], and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other;
no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand
fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own
when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses
and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he
would, and in all respects be like a god among men . . . . And this we may
truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because
he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for
wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust . . . .
If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible,
and never doing any wrong or touching what was another’s, he would be
thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would
praise him to one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with one
another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice.
Id. at 257–59.
7
Even images of eyes can lead to more honest behavior, as researchers found
in a study that showed more people cleaned up after themselves in a cafeteria
when there was a poster of eyes instead of flowers. Sander van der Linden, How
the Illusion of Being Observed Can Make You a Better Person, SCI. AM. (May 3,
2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-the-illusion-ofbeing-observed-can-make-you-better-person.
8
CONSTITUTIONAL Committee, SURVEILLANCE: CITIZENS AND THE STATE,
2008–9, H.L. 18-I, ¶¶ 70–78 (U.K.), available at http://www.public
ations.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18.pdf.
9
See ORLANDO FIGES, THE WHISPERERS: PRIVATE LIFE IN STALIN’S RUSSIA
258–59 (Picador reprint 2008) (2007) (describing a system of “mutual
surveillance” in which people were expected to spy on their families, coworkers
and neighbors, including those living with them in communal apartments);
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Rosetta Books ed. 2000) (1949) (painting a vivid
picture of life under a regime that exercises constant surveillance as a tool of
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For these reasons, surveillance presents a bit of a conundrum
for social and political theory because it is at once a condition of a
free self and a potential threat against liberty. A central
preoccupation of information privacy law scholars has been to
chart the boundaries between observational and surveillance
practices that are liberty enhancing and those that are liberty
denying. At least since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s
canonical 1890 article, technology has been a key player. 10
Despite that thread of connection to the past, there can be no
doubt that we live in very different times than Warren and
Brandeis and confront more dramatic consequences for privacy as
a result of modern technologies. 11 Whereas Warren and Brandeis
feared the impact of film cameras taking still images on privacy, 12
we live in a world populated by closed-circuit television networks,
high-resolution spy satellites, surveillance drones, and Global

social control); Julian Ryall, North Korea Steps Up Surveillance of Citizens with
(Jan.
15,
2013),
16,000
CCTV
Cameras,
TELEGRAPH
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9801850/North-Ko
rea-steps-up-surveillance-of-citizens-with-16000-CCTV-cameras.html
(reporting that North Korea now has over 101,000 cameras with which to
“tighten[] its control on the lives of the people”).
10
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (explaining that recent inventions call attention to the next
step to be taken for the protection of the person and the right to be let alone).
11
See Christopher Slobogin, An Original Take on Originalism, 125 HARV. L.
REV. F. 14, 19 (2011) (explaining “that in many areas relevant to search and
seizure we do not have a good historical account” and that many cases “do not
have analogues, even tenuous ones,” such as “special needs cases, involving a
wide range of regulatory intrusions such as drug testing and searches of students
and employees, roadblocks set up to detect illegal immigrants, and anti-terrorist
checkpoints at airports, subways, ferries, and dams” which “raise the most
contentious and important Fourth Amendment issues courts are addressing
today”).
12
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.’ ”).
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Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking technology. 13 In the late
nineteenth century, what personal information was collected
appeared in the paper files of isolated agencies and corporations. 14
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, agencies and
corporations can access nearly infinite storage capacity, integrated
data systems, powerful data aggregation technologies, and
increasingly sophisticated data mining tools. 15
With this
dramatically enhanced capacity to aggregate, store, and share
information comes corresponding threats to privacy.
In themselves, and in the aggregate, technological advances
have made it possible for public and private actors to watch us and
to know us in ways that once seemed like science fiction. Take,
for example, the “Virtual Alabama” project, a collaboration
between Alabama and Google. 16 Virtual Alabama is a data
13

See Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Public Area CCTV and
Crime Prevention: An Updated Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 26 JUST.
Q. 716, 717 (2009); Siobhan Gorman, Satellite-Surveillance Program To Begin
Despite Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122282336428992785.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Ryan J. Reilly,
FBI GPS Tracking Memos Kept Mostly Secret by Justice Department,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/16/
fbi-gps-tracking-memos_n_2488180.html; Andrea Stone, Drone Program Aims
To ‘Accelerate’ Use of Unmanned Aircraft by Police, HUFFINGTON POST (May
22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/22/drones-dhs-programunmanned-aircraft-police_n_1537074.html.
14
See ENGAGING PRIVACY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL
AGE 357 (James Waldo et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that the majority of recordkeeping in the late 19th century was local and therefore limited in its ability to
control individuals); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The
Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S.
C AL. L. REV. 241, 246 n.11 (2006) (citing ELTING E. MORISON, MEN,
MACHINES, AND MODERN TIME 54 (1966)); see, e.g., Early Census Processing
and the Seaton Device, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/
www/innovations/technology/early_census_processing_and_the_seaton_device.
html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (describing the laborious and time-consuming
process of hand-processing census information).
15
See Citron, supra note 14, at 247 (chronicling the rapid evolution of data
collection and data processing).
16
See Corey McKenna, Virtual Alabama Facilitates Data Sharing Among
State and Federal Agencies, D IGITAL COMMUNITIES (Aug. 13, 2009),
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aggregation system that combines three-dimensional satellite and
aerial imagery, geospatial analytics, feeds from traffic cameras,
private and public video systems (including feeds from one
thousand five hundred schools), GPS location data, sex offender
registries, hospital inventories, and land-ownership records,
including assessments. 17 At present, the ever-expanding scope and
reach of this technology is unchecked by constitution or statute,
suggesting that Big Brother 18 is closer than we might think.
Governments are not the only ones using modern surveillance
and data aggregation technologies to track and monitor our
activities. Vast reservoirs of our private data are gathered by or
otherwise reside in the hands of private entities. 19 GPS chips in our
telephones, cars, and computers share a steady stream of locational
information with companies providing services associated with
these devices. 20 Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) log our online
movements using “Deep-Packet Inspection.” 21
Credit card
companies and behavioral advertisers record and analyze our
shopping habits, online and offline. 22 In one apocryphal case
revealed in 2012, Target used information drawn from its internal
http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Virtual-Alabama-Facilitates-DataSharing-Among.html.
17
See id.
18
See ORWELL, supra note 9.
19
See Citron, supra note 14, at 248; Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most
of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation
of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 24–25 (2012)
(responding to Professor Kerr’s criticism of the difficult questions raised by
mosaic theory).
20
See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 677, 679 (2011).
21
See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet
Inspection, in OFFICE OF PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., DEEP P ACKET
INSPECTION ESSAY P ROJECT (2009), available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/
information/research-recherche/2009/keats-citron_200903_e.asp
22
See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/
magazine/shoppinghabits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (recounting how Target
uses publicly available databases and market analytics to identify women who
are in the early stages of pregnancy).
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and exogenous databases to identify newly pregnant women who,
they believed, would be particularly amenable to direct marketing
of products for new mothers and their infants. 23 Target and other
retailers also use ever more sophisticated behavioral and even
neurological analytics in order to drive sales. 24
As these new surveillance technologies have migrated from
science fiction to reality over the last several decades, privacy
scholars have updated and expanded upon Warren and Brandeis’s
warnings. 25 Principal among their concerns are the effects of
continuous, indiscriminate, and often invasive surveillance on our
abilities to pursue and enjoy basic liberties. 26 Privacy scholars
have documented the risks and realities of abuse by those who
acquire and hold substantial quantities of personal data. 27 As our
lives have become increasingly dependent on data reservoirs, they
23

Id.
Id.
25
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 1805, 1831–32 (2010) (proposing “potential strategies for ensuring privacy
tort law’s efficacy in the information age” that build upon the theories of Warren
and Brandeis); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for A Heavyweight: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362–63
(1983) (arguing that, as technological intrusions become more prevalent, privacy
law should focus on the source of the information, rather than whether it is
exposed to the public).
26
See, e.g., J ULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW,
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 141 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy,
Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 195 (2008);
Freiwald, supra note 20, at 679; Susan Freiwald, First Principles of
Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007); Paul M.
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 837 (2000);
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 905, 931–39 (2009);
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal
Information and the Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 553, 560–61 (1995).
27
See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 44–47 (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 33 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling
Government’s 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 822 (2010); Citron, supra note 25, at 1805; Citron, supra note 14.
24
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have warned us about the dangers of error and misinformation. 28
Despite these calls for concern, however, courts mostly have
stayed out of the fray. 29 The political branches have likewise left
the expansion of surveillance technologies largely unchecked, save
for a few reactionary pieces of legislation addressing a narrow
range of concerns such as banking and telephone records. 30
All of this seems about to change. On January 23, 2012, in
United States v. Jones, 31 the U.S. Supreme Court had the
opportunity to decide whether the Fourth Amendment might
impose some restraint on the use of modern surveillance
technologies by law enforcement officers and their private-sector
28

See Citron, supra note 25.
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:
A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1025 (2010) (describing case law
on Internet communication, surveillance and data breaches as “sparse”). But see
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989) (prohibiting the disclosure of FBI rap sheets to third parties under FOIA);
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971) (limiting the dissemination
of arrest records).
30
See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984) (“In
1978, in response to this Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, . . .
Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act . . . . That statute accords
customers of banks and similar financial institutions certain rights to be notified
of and to challenge in court administrative subpoenas of financial records in the
possession of the banks.”); M. Todd Heflin, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf:
Why the Fear of Carnivore Is an Irrational Product of the Digital Age, 107
DICK. L. REV. 343, 352 (2002) (“Partially in response to the Court’s decision in
Katz, Congress codified Fourth Amendment principles, as applied to oral and
written communications, in Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 . . . .”); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 857–58 (2002) (describing the
controversial confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court
nomination leading up to Congress’s passage of the Video Privacy Protection
Act of 1988); Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age:
The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1321, 1322–23 n.5
(2004) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Maryland—that
the use of pen registers to record telephone numbers did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment—led to Congress passing limited regulations on government use of
the technology and citing to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986).
31
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
29
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proxies. Although the Court demurred for the time being, a
majority of the sitting Justices expressed sympathy for what has
come to be known as the “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment
privacy. 32 The fundamental insight behind the mosaic theory is
that we can maintain reasonable expectations of Fourth
Amendment privacy in certain quantities of information and data
even if we lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the
constituent parts of that whole. 33
This Article examines and explores the mosaic theory.
Although the debate is in its early stages, the mosaic theory
exposes an important, but heretofore underappreciated, quantitative
dimension of Fourth Amendment privacy. 34 Nevertheless, the
proposals made so far to convert that insight into a set of workable
rules and principles are unconvincing. Part II provides a detailed
exegesis of the mosaic theory by reviewing Jones and its
predecessor litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. Part III reviews and expands upon the major
conceptual, doctrinal, and practical objections that have been
raised in the literature. Part IV deepens the discussion by
exploring responses that mosaic advocates might make in defense
of their theory. Part V concludes that, for the mosaic theory to be a
serious response to the disconcerting encroachment of modern
surveillance technologies on our reasonable expectations of
privacy, its proponents must develop a practical means of
implementation. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article,

32

See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 3–4; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012).
33
See Ryan Calo, Don’t Let Privacy Go To The Dogs: A Proposal To Wait
On Jardines, USVJONES.COM (June 2, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/02/
dont-let-privacy-go-to-the-dogs-a-proposal-to-wait-on-jardines/ (implying that
the mosaic theory does not address the use of drones for dragnet surveillance);
Woodrow Hartzog, United States v. Jones and the Need to Embrace Obscurity,
USVJONES.COM (June 2, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/02/united-states-vjones-and-the-need-to-embrace-obscurity/ (concluding that the mosaic theory
supports an obscurity-based analysis of privacy).
34
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in
part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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the authors argue elsewhere that any such proposal must focus on
the technologies. 35
II. THE MOSAIC THEORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
Although privacy scholars have been beating a steady drum
against the threats of broad and indiscriminate surveillance posed
by contemporary advancements in surveillance technology, there
has been relatively little resistance from legislatures and courts. 36
To be sure, there are some exceptions. Public discomfort with the
unprecedented data mining and data sharing “Total Information
Awareness” system under development at the Department of
Defense in the late 1990s and early 2000s 37 resulted in Congress’s
cutting funding in 2004. 38 But that system has resurfaced in other
governmental surveillance programs, just with different names,
like “fusion centers.” 39 Congress recently expressed concerns
about fusion centers, which are cooperative data gathering,
aggregation, and analysis ventures among local, state, and federal
agencies in collaboration with private-sector allies, 40 but has yet to
suggest any serious plans to regulate the use of these or any other
35

See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013).
36
See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
37
See John Markoff, Chief Takes Over at Agency To Thwart Attacks on U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/13/us/chieftakes-over-at-agency-thwart-attacks-on-us.html;
Jeffrey
Rosen,
Total
Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/12/15/magazine/15TOTA.html; William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/opinion/you-are-asuspect.html.
38
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8131, 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003).
39
See U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 1
(2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/fusion.pdf.
40
See id. (“The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned
detailees to the fusion centers forwarded ‘intelligence’ of uneven quality—often
times shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and
Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public
sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.”).
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surveillance technologies. 41 In the face of persistent inaction by
the legislature, courts have begun to step into the breach. 42 In this
transformative environment, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in United States v. Jones. 43
In 2004, a joint task force of federal and local law enforcement
in Washington, D.C. began investigating a narcotics conspiracy
that included Lawrence Maynard and Antoine Jones. 44 During the
course of their investigation, officers sought and received warrants
that allowed them to tap Maynard’s and Jones’s phones and to
attach and monitor a GPS-enabled tracking device 45 to Jones’s
automobile. 46 The GPS warrant required that the officers install
41

Both Democrat- and Republican-sponsored bills attempting to regulate
surveillance died in committee last session. See, e.g., Preserving Freedom from
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 3287, 112th Cong. (2012), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3287/text; Protecting America’s
Privacy Act of 2012, S. 3515, 112th Cong. (2012), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3515/text (limiting the overseas
acquisition of information about a persons believed to be in the United States).
But see Natasha Singer, Their Apps Track You. Will Congress Track Them?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/technology/
legislation-would-regulate-tracking-of-cellphone-users.html?_r=0 (reporting on
Senator Al Franken’s continued effort to regulate the use of tracking technology
in cell phones); cf. Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S. 1223, 112th
Cong. (2012), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/
HEN12877-Franken-Sub.pdf. (proposing controls on government and private
access to locational data acquired through cellular phones and GPS devices).
42
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
43
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
44
Id. at 948 (majority opinion); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549
(D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
45
See Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 411–13 (2007) (explaining
GPS-enabled tracking technology).
46
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The vehicle in question was registered to Jones’s
wife, but the Government conceded, and the district court found, that Jones had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Jeep. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555–56
n.*. The Supreme Court later held that Jones also had a property interest in the
Jeep. Jones 132 S. Ct. at 948. All courts therefore referred to the Jeep as
“Jones’s.”
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the device within ten days and within the District of Columbia. 47
Unfortunately, officers violated both of these terms, installing the
device a day late and while Jones’s vehicle was parked in a
suburban Maryland parking lot. 48 They nevertheless used the
device to track Jones for twenty-eight days, during which time they
collected over two thousand pages of tracking data. 49
Based on the officers’ failure to abide the terms of their
warrant, Jones moved at trial to suppress all evidence discovered
by or through the GPS device. 50 The trial court, relying on United
States v. Knotts, 51 denied his motion.52 In Knotts, the United States
Supreme Court held that using a radio beeper device to track a
defendant over the course of an afternoon did not violate the
subject’s reasonable expectations of privacy because he had
knowingly exposed himself to public observation. 53 Therefore, the
beeper tracking was “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.” 54 The trial judge in
Jones’s case saw no distinction between surveillance conducted
using GPS and surveillance conducted using a beeper device
because, in both cases, the technology revealed nothing more to
officers than what the subjects had knowingly exposed to the
public: their movements along public roads. 55 Although the
officers in Jones violated the terms of their warrant, the trial court
found that they were not required to get a warrant in the first place,
and therefore did not violate Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights. 56
Based in part on evidence produced using the GPS-enabled
tracking device, Jones was convicted. 57 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
47

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
52
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
53
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282–85.
54
Id. at 285.
55
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 949.
48
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reversed. 58 Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Ginsburg held
that Knotts did not control. 59 Knotts, he wrote, “held only that ‘a
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another,’ not that such a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world
without end.” 60 Furthermore, he argued, there is a constitutionally
significant difference between being tracked and monitored for an
afternoon and being tracked and monitored twenty-four hours a
day for four weeks. 61 The constitutional line, according to Judge
Ginsburg’s opinion, is marked by reasonable expectations of
privacy. 62
We knowingly expose ourselves to public observation
whenever we leave the house. We must therefore expect that we
will sometimes be observed during the course of our daily lives.
According to Judge Ginsburg, however, the same cannot be said of
our public movements in the aggregate. 63 Quite to the contrary, we
reasonably expect that we are not being watched constantly. 64
Thus, according to Judge Ginsburg’s panel, constant and sustained
government surveillance constitutes a “search” for Fourth

58

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
59
Id. at 556.
60
Id. at 557.
61
Id. at 556–57.
62
Id. at 557.
63
Id. at 558; see also id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone
to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his
origin, route, destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there;
rather, he expects, each of those movements to remain ‘disconnected and
anonymous.’ ”).
64
In an analogous way, state harassment laws and privacy tort law have
reinforced the notion that people can expect to be free from unreasonable
surveillance. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1973)
(upholding an injunction against a persistent paparazzo); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924
F. Supp. 1413, 1433–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining surveillance of a family on
the grounds it was part of “a persistent course of hounding, harassment and
unreasonable surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi-public place”).
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Amendment purposes. 65
Because Jones had a “reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a
month . . . , and the use of the GPS device to monitor those
movements defeated that reasonable expectation,” 66 the officers in
Jones were obliged to submit themselves to Fourth Amendment
constraints. 67 By violating the terms of their warrant, they failed in
that duty. 68
The circuit court therefore vacated Jones’s
conviction. 69
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 70
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the officers’
installation of the GPS device was a search because it was
accomplished by a trespass and for the purpose of obtaining
information. 71 According to Justice Scalia, “We have no doubt that
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted.” 72 Because the officers violated the terms of their warrant
when installing the device, they violated Jones’s Fourth
Amendment rights. 73 All subsequent monitoring of the device was
65

Maynard, 615 F.3d at 567 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–
63 (1979)).
66
Id. at 563.
67
See id. at 566–68.
68
Id.
69
According to its decretal paragraph, the court “reversed” Jones’s
conviction, but one assumes that the court intended to leave open the possibility
of a retrial if the Government chose to go forward without evidence obtained by
the GPS-enabled monitoring. See, e.g., id. at 568 (“To be sure, absent the GPS
data a jury reasonably might have inferred Jones was involved in the
conspiracy.”).
70
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
71
Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hen the government does engage in a physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
72
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
73
See id. at 949, 954 (citing Maynard, 615 F.3d 544) (affirming the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that “reversed the conviction
because of admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS
device which, it said, violated the Fourth Amendment”). Judge Kavanaugh
proposed trespass as a narrower ground for the decision in his dissent from the
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a fruit of this initial violation, so Justice Scalia saw no need to
address the broader question of whether using the device to track
Jones might constitute a separate and independent Fourth
Amendment search. 74
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Justice Alito
concurred. 75 After expressing considerable skepticism about the
majority’s trespass rule, Justice Alito focused his attention on
defending the basic premises of the quantitative theory of Fourth
Amendment privacy upon which Judge Ginsburg relied in the
court below. 76 For Justice Alito, the central Fourth Amendment
issues presented to the Court by the facts in Jones arose from the
use of new surveillance technologies. “In the pre-computer age,”
he wrote, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.” 77
It was simply
impossible for law enforcement to conduct continuous surveillance
of a suspect for four weeks using only traditional techniques. 78 As
a consequence of these practical limitations, Justice Alito echoed
the circuit court’s point that we have good reason to believe that
we are not subject to constant surveillance. 79 Although “short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable,” Justice Alito wrote, “longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of

circuit court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc. See United States v.
Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
74
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
75
Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
76
Id.
77
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 963–64; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir.
2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (“A
reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of
every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each
place he stops and how long he stays there . . . .”); see also Hutchins, supra note
45, 455–56.
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privacy.” 80
Despite joining the majority opinion, Justice
Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence in Jones to express broad
sympathy with Justice Alito’s quantitative approach to assessing
Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 81
The general theory of Fourth Amendment privacy advanced by
Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Judge Ginsburg in these
opinions has been described as the mosaic theory. 82 Although its
various proponents differ in the details, the core insight that drives
the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy is that we can
maintain reasonable expectations of privacy in certain quantities of
information and data even if we lack reasonable expectations of
privacy in the constituent parts of those wholes. 83 Although it was
not adopted in Jones, there appear to be five votes on the Court for
adopting some version of the mosaic theory. 84 As a consequence,
in the months after Jones there has been a rush of commentary on
the conceptual, doctrinal, and practical viability of the mosaic
theory. 85 The remainder of this Article will review and add to this
80

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Stephen
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine
of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 547–48 (2005)
(describing the direct relationship between privacy expectations and factors such
as duration of travel and route complexity).
81
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
82
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Kerr, supra note 32, at 311. Justice Alito
does not adopt the phrase “mosaic theory,” but neither does he indicate any
point of disagreement with Judge Ginsburg’s basic mosaic framework. See
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64. The term “mosaic” is borrowed from national
security law, where the Government has defended against requests made under
the Freedom of Information Act on the grounds that when otherwise innocuous
information is aggregated it can reveal secret methods and sources. See
generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005).
83
See Daniel Solove, United States v. Jones and the Future of Privacy Law:
The Potential Far-Reaching Implications of the GPS Surveillance Case,
USVJONES.COM (June 1, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/01/the-potentialfar-reaching-implications-of-the-gps-surveillance-case/#more-146 (approving of
the mosaic theory’s expansion of privacy).
84
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito,
J., concurring in an opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan).
85
See infra Parts III & IV.
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debate, beginning with an overview of the main challenges brought
by critics and skeptics of the mosaic theory.
III. THE MOSAIC THEORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
In the months after Maynard and Jones, the mosaic theory has
been subject to considerable criticism both inside and outside the
courts. Most of these objections fall into one of three categories:
conceptual, doctrinal, and practical. This Part describes the most
prominent and compelling objections in each of these categories
and contributes a few more along the way. The conversation in
subsequent Parts considers some responses that have been
advanced by defenders of the mosaic theory, proposes a few more,
and concludes that the mosaic theory cannot be dismissed
prematurely, but that proponents bear the considerable burden of
addressing practical concerns.
A. Conceptual Objections to the Mosaic Theory
Critics have met the mosaic theory with a basic arithmetical
challenge that inheres in the mosaic approach itself. The mosaic
theory is not needed to protect information that is already secured
behind the veil of reasonable expectations of privacy. The mosaic
theory is needed, and is therefore salient, only when the conduct or
information at issue does not, when considered discretely,
implicate reasonable expectations of privacy. The mosaic theory
holds that, in some cases, certain quanta of data, or perhaps certain
quanta of certain kinds of data, 86 implicate reasonable expectations
of privacy even though the constituent parts do not. 87 So framed,
86

See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (criticizing Justice Alito’s suggestion that
seriousness of the target crime might be a factor in assessing the Fourth
Amendment analysis of informational mosaics). As we argue elsewhere, there
are good doctrinal grounds for courts to include the seriousness of suspected
criminal conduct when conducting the balancing of interests that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness demands. See infra notes 75–83 and accompanying
text.
87
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
The Maynard opinion recounts several compelling examples:
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by
any single visit, as does one's not visiting any of these places over the
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the mosaic theory seems to violate basic rules of arithmetic. 88
Judge Sentelle perhaps put it best in his dissent from the D.C.
Circuit’s denial of the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc
in Jones when he pointed out that “[t]he sum of an infinite number
of zero-value parts is also zero.” 89 Although a bit punchy in the
presentation, the conceptual issue is clear enough.
The problem that Judge Sentelle identifies is not merely
mathematical. It also highlights the mosaic theory’s apparent
absence of Fourth Amendment pedigree and its potential tensions
with mainstays of Fourth Amendment doctrine and analysis. For
example, most searches are the result of what might be described
as evolving encounters. That is, officers develop reasonable
suspicion or probable cause through a series of investigative steps
and interactions with suspects. 90 As Orin Kerr has pointed out, the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has always taken a
synchronic rather than diachronic approach when evaluating the
reasonableness of law enforcement conduct during these evolving
encounters. 91 The Court’s recent decision in Kentucky v. King 92
provides a ready example.
course of a month. The sequence of a person's movements can reveal still
more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a
different story.
Id. at 562.
88
An additive mathematical identity, in this case zero, does not change the
number to which it is added.
Additive Identity, MERRIAM WEBSTER
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/additive%20
identity (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
89
United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle J.,
dissenting); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (“The concurrence posits that
‘relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets’ is
okay, but that ‘the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses’ is not good.
That introduces yet another novelty into our
jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)).
90
One court explained “evolving encounters” as a situation “where new facts
continually emerge . . . justifying police action that only moments before would
have been unlawful.” People v. Sloup, 834 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (Ill. App. 2005).
91
Kerr, supra note 32, at 314–19, 337.
92
131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
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In King, police officers followed a suspect, who had just
purchased crack cocaine from an undercover agent, into an
apartment building. 93 As they entered the building’s breezeway,
they heard a door close, but could not discern which of two
apartments the suspect had entered. 94 The officers had no reason to
think that the suspect knew he was being followed, so they had no
claim of hot pursuit or any other emergency at that point. 95 They
did, however, detect the smell of burning marijuana emanating
from behind one door, so they decided to knock, announce
themselves, and request entry. 96
The predictable ensued.
Immediately after announcing their presence, the officers heard
noises inside the apartment that might reasonably have indicated
that evidence was being destroyed. 97 Based on that suspicion, the
officers forced the door open and entered the apartment. 98 Once
inside, the officers seized several people on the scene, conducted a
Buie 99 protective sweep, and in the course of that search found
marijuana, cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and cash in plain view. 100
As it turned out, the initial suspect was not in the apartment, but
three other people were, including the eventual respondent: Hollis
King. 101
King was convicted on several narcotics charges and appealed
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. 102 Although skeptical that the
sounds officers heard coming from the apartment were enough to
justify an unwarranted entry under the emergency exception to the

93

Id. at 1854.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335–36 (1990) (“The sweep lasts no
longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger [to the
officers] and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and
depart the premises.”).
100
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1855.
94
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warrant clause, the Kentucky court assumed as much. 103 It
nevertheless held that King’s conviction should be vacated because
the officers created the emergency. 104 In that court’s view, it was
unreasonable from a Fourth Amendment perspective for officers to
knock on the apartment door because it was foreseeable, given the
circumstances, that doing so would create an emergency. 105 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 106
In doing so, it rejected
approaches adopted in lower courts that required assessing the
reasonableness of law enforcement conduct holistically by looking
at the totality of an evolving encounter that eventually resulted in a
search or arrest. 107 The Court instead recommitted itself to
assessing the reasonableness of officer conduct at each step of an
The Court therefore held that all the Fourth
encounter. 108
Amendment requires is that, at each stage of an evolving
investigation or engagement, officers limit themselves to conduct
that is reasonable based on what they know or observe. 109 In so
holding, the Court reaffirmed its longstanding commitment 110 to an
objective and synchronic assessment of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.
The mosaic theory raises serious concerns when considered in
the light of cases like King. Beyond the mathematical challenge of
adding nothings to get something, the very idea of an additive or
holistic approach to evaluating Fourth Amendment reasonableness
runs contrary to the synchronic approach that is a foundation of
long-standing Fourth Amendment analysis.

103

Id.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1864.
107
Id. at 1858–61 (describing and rejecting tests based on assessments of “bad
faith” and reasonable foreseeability that law enforcement conduct leading to an
emergency).
108
Id. at 1863–64.
109
Id.
110
See Kerr, supra note 32, 320–43 (explaining the development and
application of the synchronic approach to Fourth Amendment cases).
104
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B. Doctrinal Objections to the Mosaic Theory
The mosaic theory endorsed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia and a majority of concurring Justices in
United States v. Jones proposes nothing short of a revolution in
Fourth Amendment law. Never before has the Court suggested
that we can have reasonable expectations of privacy in certain
quantities or aggregations of information even if we have no such
expectations in the constituent parts. 111 As with any doctrinal
revolution, the mosaic theory appears to require some blood on the
floor. Specifically, adopting a mosaic approach to the Fourth
Amendment may require abandoning or dramatically altering two
important lines of Fourth Amendment law: the public observation
doctrine 112 and the third party doctrine. 113 To the extent that this is
so, commitments to these doctrines, or simply to stare decisis,
counsel caution before adopting a mosaic theory of Fourth
Amendment privacy.
Adopting a mosaic approach to quantitative privacy seems to
require abandoning the public observation doctrine, which is often
credited to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Knotts.114 In Knotts, the Court held that using a beeper device to
track a suspect’s car on public streets did not constitute a “search”
because the suspect lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in
111

United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
112
See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling in public
places).
113
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” (citations omitted));
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (citing the Government’s argument
that the mosaic theory as applied to surveillance will hamper police
investigations).
114
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“This Court has to date not deviated from the
understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search.”); see
also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another.”).
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his public movements. 115 Although the beeper allowed officers to
follow Knotts more efficiently and with fewer personnel, the
Knotts Court specifically declined to hold that using technology
raises any independent Fourth Amendment concerns simply
because it makes it easier for law enforcement officers to conduct
surveillance that they are otherwise entitled to do using traditional
means. 116
The parallels between Knotts and Jones are obvious. In both
cases, law enforcement officers used a passive signaling device
attached to a car. 117 In both cases, the devices revealed only
movements on public streets. 118 In both cases, those movements
were exposed to public view. 119 Given these similarities, Knotts
would seem to control in a case like Jones, thus barring Fourth
Amendment review of GPS-enabled tracking so long as the
technology is only used to monitor movements in public. 120 Should
the Court eventually adopt a mosaic approach to assessing and
protecting quantitative privacy, it would therefore seem obliged to
overrule or modify Knotts and the long line of subsequent cases 121
endorsing investigative-surveillance techniques and technologies

115

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
Id. at 284–85.
117
Id. at 277 (“A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which
emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”); Jones, 132 S.
Ct. at 947 (“By means of signals from multiple satellites, the [GPS] device
established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that
location by cellular phone to a Government computer.”).
118
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
119
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
120
United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting); id. at 769–70 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
121
See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1998) (holding that anything
visible at four hundred feet in the air is open to public view); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that garbage cans left out for
collection is open to public rummaging); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986) (holding that anything visible from public airspace is open to public
view).
116
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that merely document what targets knowingly expose to public
view. 122
Among the most compelling examples of these potential
disruptions is the effect of the mosaic theory on traditional human
surveillance. 123 Visual surveillance is a mainstay of targeted police
investigations. Police officers routinely conduct “stake-outs,”
sometimes using teams of officers and vehicles to track suspects as
they move through public spaces. 124 Law enforcement agencies
also aggregate information from informants to develop detailed
accounts of suspects’ public movements. 125 These practices are not
only commonplace, 126 they have been routinely endorsed by courts
122

Jones, 625 F.3d at 769 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere in Knotts or
any other Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decision since the adoption of the
expectation of privacy rationale in Katz has the Court ever suggested that the
test of the reasonable expectation is in any way related to the intent of the user
of the data obtained by the surveillance or other alleged search.”).
123
Id. at 769 (“Therefore, it would appear, as appellee argues, that this novel
aggregation approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy would prohibit
not only GPS-augmented surveillance, but any other police surveillance of
sufficient length to support consolidation of data into the sort of pattern or
mosaic contemplated by the panel. . . . I cannot discern any distinction.”); Kerr,
supra note 32, at 335 (“If the police send a team of investigators to place the
suspect under visual surveillance, should that visual surveillance be subject to
the same [mosaic] analysis?”).
124
See LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179
(Anderson Publishing, 7th ed. 2012) (“The bulk of surveillance conducted by
police agencies is physical surveillance.”); Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways,
THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/
09/03/120903fa_fact_stillman#ixzz2J3ZyPWC7 (“By some estimates, up to
eighty per cent of all drug cases in America involve [informants]”); see sources
cited supra note 126 and accompanying text.; cf. 3 COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL WELFARE 228–29 (Karen M. Sowers et al. eds.,
2008) (concluding that the use of multiple informants is “the most effective
strategy . . . to gather assessment data about a child”).
125
See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 60 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding
that the combined information of three confidential informants along with other
surveillance was sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the
home of a suspected drug dealer); see also State v. McCain, 713 S.E.2d 21, 28
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that multiple “informants, citizens and
anonymous callers” provided enough probable cause for a search warrant).
126
See sources cited supra note 124.
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as well within Fourth Amendment bounds 127—a view that is shared
even among mosaic promoters 128—because they document conduct
and movements in which the suspect or target has no reasonable
expectation of privacy. 129 The mosaic theory puts these practices
and the line of doctrine endorsing them in obvious jeopardy,
particularly when officers are too successful and their
investigations produce too much information. 130 How, after all, are
we to distinguish “between the supposed invasion by aggregation
of data between the GPS-augmented surveillance and a purely
visual surveillance of substantial length”? 131
In addition to the public observation doctrine, the mosaic
theory also threatens to unsettle the “third party doctrine.” 132 The
Court has long held that citizens who share information with others
assume the risk that what they share might be passed along to law
enforcement. 133 Applying this rule, the Court has held that there is
no Fourth Amendment violation if a criminal confederate shares
127

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 125.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable.”).
129
See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
aff’d sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (“Surveillance that reveals only what is
already exposed to the public—such as a person’s movements during a single
journey—is not a search.”) (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285
(1983)).
130
United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
131
Id. As we shall see below, one important mosaic defender resolves this
apparent tension by submitting all surveillance, whether manual or
technologically-enhanced, to the same time constraints. See infra Part IV.C.
132
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 526
(2006) (“This doctrine provides that if information is possessed or known by
third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”).
133
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[A citizen] takes
the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government . . . even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” (citations omitted)).
128
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the confidences of his co-conspirators with police, 134 if a bank
shares a customer’s financial records with law enforcement, 135 or if
a telephone company discloses records of phone calls customers
make or receive. 136 More recently, a New York court ruled that a
customer of the social networking website Twitter 137 had no
standing to challenge a lawful subpoena issued against the
company for locational information embedded in his posts because
he voluntarily shared that information with Twitter. 138
As Justice Sotomayor, who expresses sympathy for some
version of the mosaic theory in her Jones concurrence, points out,
“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties.” 139 That is because we routinely share
vast quantities of data with private agents, many of whom store
it. 140 Our Internet service providers track and keep detailed records
of where we go on the internet. 141 Our chosen search engines
134

See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 299–302 (1966) (holding that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation of privacy when a co-conspirator told
police about plans to bribe jury members).
135
Cal. Banker’s Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67–69 (1974). Congress
responded to decisions like Miller and Shultz by passing the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006), which provides bank
customers some privacy regarding their records held by banks and other
financial institutions and stipulates procedures whereby federal agencies can
gain access to those records.
136
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that a person who
uses a phone “assume[s] the risk that the [telephone] company [will] reveal to
the police the numbers he dialed”). The Pen Register Act attempted to fill the
void left by Smith v. Maryland by requiring a court order to use a pen register or
trap and trace device. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
§ 301(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2001); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, T HE
D IGITAL P ERSON 205 (2004) (“Whereas a pen register records the telephone
numbers a person dials from her home, a trap and trace device creates a list of
the telephone numbers of incoming calls.”).
137
TWITTER, https://twitter.com. (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
138
People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507–10 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
139
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
140
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 7; Citron, supra note 14.
141
See Citron, supra note 21.

SPRING 2013]

A Shattered Looking Glass

407

gather information not only on our search patterns, but also where
we go, what we look at, and what stimuli we react to while
online. 142 For most of us, law enforcement would not need to
install GPS-enabled devices on our persons or cars if they wanted
to track us in the same way that officers tracked the defendants in
Jones because we already carry GPS chips in our telephones, cars,
and computers that pass along information about our movements to
a wide range of third parties, from map services to social network
applications and restaurant rating sites. 143 Moreover, these third
parties are already in the habit of sharing much of the information
they gather. Data brokers aggregate and analyze vast reservoirs of
data from financial institutions, retailers, public records, social
networking sites, and just about anywhere we interact with the
physical or virtual worlds. 144 The third party doctrine provides the
Government with unfettered access to all of this data 145—so much
so that Chris Hoofnagle has coined the phrase “Big Brother’s Little
Helpers” to describe data brokers like Acxiom, 146 which aggregate
data from public and third-party sources to compile detailed
mosaics of information on anyone and everyone. 147
As Justice Alito suggested in his Jones concurrence, most of
this information sharing is motivated by an interest in
142

See Declan McCullagh, FAQ: Protecting Yourself from Search Engines,
CNET (Aug. 8, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/FAQ-Protecting-yourself-fromsearch-engines/2100-1025_3-6103486.html.
143
See Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
489, 493, 528 (2012) (“Precise, persistent cell phone tracking also provides
considerably more information: it reveals a person’s location at all times, not
just when he or she is driving.”).
144
See generally U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf
(explaining
the
Commission’s recommendations to companies for increased consumer privacy).
145
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for
the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1451 (2011).
146
ACXIOM, http://www.acxiom.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
147
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint
and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595 (2004).
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convenience. 148 We readily embrace “[n]ew technolog[ies] [that]
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of
privacy.” 149 Having done so, the third party doctrine instructs us
that there is no violation of reasonable expectations of privacy if
the Government gains access to personal information through those
with whom we have shared it. Proponents of the mosaic approach
to quantitative privacy resist this result, but in doing so appear
obliged to modify or overturn the third party doctrine. 150 This
would not only mean a break with long-established doctrine, but
would also throw into doubt a wide range of common investigative
techniques, notably the use of confidential informants, accessing
credit histories, and confirming residential histories.
C. Practical Concerns with the Mosaic Theory
Many of the conceptual and doctrinal issues outlined in the
foregoing sections lead to serious practical concerns that critics on
and off the courts have argued should urge us to caution before
adopting the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. The
most crucial is that translating the mosaic theory into practice will
mean drawing important lines between aggregations of information
that trigger reasonable expectations of privacy and those that do
not. 151 Justice Scalia identifies the challenges in Jones. As he puts
the point, mosaic advocates are on the hook for a coherent,
practical, and doctrinally acceptable test that explains why shortterm monitoring is allowed but “a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’
too long.” 152 In an early commentary on Jones, Orin Kerr echoed
Justice Scalia’s concerns, asking, “How long must the tool be used
148

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
150
See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 19, at 16–17; cf. Kerr, supra note 32, at 332
(using third-party data collection to illustrate the difficulty in determining when
the mosaic theory will apply to information gathering).
151
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954; Kerr, supra note 32, at 330–31 (claiming that the
mosaic theory lacks a clear standard).
152
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. For further discussion of Knotts, see supra notes
51–56, 115–122, and accompanying text. Gray & Citron, supra note 34, meets
this challenge.
149
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before the relevant mosaic is created?” 153 As Kerr has further
pointed out, this line-drawing problem extends past mosaics
constructed using a single investigative method, as was the case in
Jones, 154 to include investigative portfolios aggregated using a
variety of methods, perhaps including human surveillance. 155
There is no doubt that this line-drawing problem is serious.
Among the most important burdens of any Fourth Amendment
standard is that it must provide clear guidance to police officers
and lower courts. 156 Muddy and unpredictable tests are both unfair
and ultimately fail to provide substantial protection. 157 From a
more theoretical perspective, failure to provide fair warning may,
as Lon Fuller has argued, constitute a failure to make law in the
first place. 158 This failure to adequately make law ultimately
compromises the goal of protecting rights. After all, if law
enforcement officers cannot predict with certainty whether
investigative programs implicate the Fourth Amendment, then they
are that much more likely to routinely, if unintentionally, violate

153

See Kerr, supra note 32, at 330–33.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.
155
See Kerr, supra note 32, at 334.
156
See id. at 331–32 (explaining the uncertainty created under the mosaic
theory as to when in the course of a surveillance a search occurs).
157
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”); United States v. Jones,
625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
mosaic theory does not produce predictable results); see, e.g., United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (declaring that searching an arrested person
is reasonable under the 4th Amendment); see also Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 622–23 (2004) (“The need for a clear rule, readily understood by
police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or
were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort
of generalization which Belton enunciated.”). But see Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 34 (1996) (reflecting that the Court has “consistently eschewed brightline rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry”).
158
See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–39 (2d ed. 1964).
154
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the very reasonable expectations of privacy that the mosaic theory
seeks to identify and protect. 159
Troublesome in their own right, these line-drawing problems
also raise serious concerns that the mosaic theory would
dramatically skew the balance of interests urged by the Fourth
Amendment. 160
At base, Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requires protecting both the legitimate interests of law enforcement
officers and the privacy interests of citizens. 161 As the Court has
often indicated, providing officers with clear rules of conduct
preserves this balance by erecting important privacy protections
and by preserving adequate space for aggressive law
enforcement. 162 Some commentators have suggested that the very
vagueness of the mosaic theory threatens to paralyze law
enforcement officers in the midst of active investigations because
they will be forced to worry constantly whether their efforts have
been so successful that they have created a mosaic, implicating the
Fourth Amendment. 163
Assuming that mosaic advocates can meet line drawing
concerns, downstream issues of application remain. For example,
should investigations that could potentially create mosaics be
bound by the warrant requirement, or will it be enough for officers
to justify their conduct retrospectively? 164 If a warrant is not
required, what level of suspicion is necessary to justify
investigations that might generate mosaics? 165 Is reasonable
suspicion sufficient, or is probable cause required? 166 Should there
be different standards for different investigative techniques or
159

See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1468, 1468–69 (1985).
160
Jones, 625 F.3d at 767–68 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
aggregation technique of the mosaic theory would impede previously acceptable
police investigation techniques).
161
See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213–14; cf. Slobogin, supra note 19, at 5.
163
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 32, at 331–32, 347–50.
164
Id. at 338.
165
See id.
166
Id.
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mosaics of different form, nature, or dimension? 167 Then there is
the question of remedy. As the Court has made clear, a Fourth
Amendment violation does not determine the remedy. 168 Should
the exclusionary rule govern mosaic violations? 169 If so, will it be
effective given the likelihood that many mosaic violations will be
the result of investigations pursued in good faith that are simply
more successful retrospectively than law enforcement thought they
would be ex ante? 170 For its detractors, the mosaic theory simply
creates too many questions and not enough answers to become a
rule of force in Fourth Amendment law.
IV. DEFENDING THE MOSAIC THEORY
Mosaic advocates have not been silent in the face of objections
and concerns advanced by the theory’s critics. To the contrary,
they have both met the objections and developed concrete
proposals meant to address many of these concerns. This Part
reviews some of those efforts, suggests other possible responses,
and offers assessments of their success.
A. Responding to Conceptual Objections
Among the most nettlesome of conceptual objections to the
mosaic theory is Judge Sentelle’s premise that “[t]he sum of an
infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.” 171 If Knotts was
correctly decided, and we do not have reasonable expectations of
privacy in our public movements, then we cannot, by modus
tollens and within the rules of arithmetic, have a reasonable

167

Id. at 338–39.
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (“For exclusion
to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy
costs.”); United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (“The fact that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the
exclusionary rule applies.” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).
169
See Kerr, supra note 32, at 340.
170
Id. at 341.
171
United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
168
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expectation of privacy in any aggregated collection of our public
movements.
Mosaic advocates appear to respond that the critique
misunderstands the point. Reasonable expectations of privacy,
they contend, are not theoretical. 172 Rather, they are practical
assessments of common social practices and expectations. 173 Thus,
as Judge Ginsburg explains, it is both possible and likely that a
“passerby” might “observe or even follow someone during a single
journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work.” 174
We are all familiar with such happenstances, and at one point or
another have found ourselves driving the same roads with a fellow
traveler for miles and hours, or perhaps even briefly following
someone who looks vaguely familiar to determine whether they
are, in fact, that person on whom we had a crush in the eighth
grade. By contrast, Judge Ginsburg points out, “the likelihood that
a stranger would observe all [of ‘a person’s movements over the
course of a month’] is not just remote, it is essentially nil.” 175 Cast
in this practical light, Judge Sentelle’s conceptual criticism seems
to have little traction on the mosaic theory because the atomicmolecular distinction between individual bits of data and large
aggregations of data proposed by the mosaic theory is grounded in
autoethnography 176 and practical realities rather than ontology.
172

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559–60 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (citing Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (discussing practical social expectations regarding
the touching and manipulation of bags on a passenger bus); Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445 (1998) (discussing practical social expectations regarding flight in
public airspace); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (discussing
practical social expectations regarding the contents of garbage cans left out for
collection); and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (discussing practical
social expectations regarding flight in public airspace)).
173
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559–560.
174
Id. at 560.
175
Id.
176
Autoethnographic research focuses on “analyz[ing] personal experience in
order to study cultural experience.” Carolyn Ellis, Tony Adams & Arthur
Bochner, Autoethnography:
An Overview, 12 FORUM QUALITATIVE
SOZIALFORSCHUNG / FORUM: QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. 1 (2011).
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Although tempting in some ways, this purely practical
approach to defending the mosaic theory probably does not
provide much of a safe harbor. The reason why is evident from the
Court’s holding in United States v. Kyllo. 177 There, the Court was
asked whether the use of a heat detection device “to explore details
of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion” constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 178
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that it did, in part because
the device in question was “not in general public use.” 179 The
implication, of course, is that if heat detection devices became
ubiquitous features of smartphone cameras, such that any member
of the public could observe heat emanations from a home, then
police officers would be entitled to do the same without
implicating the Fourth Amendment. There could no longer be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those emanations from a
descriptive, ethnographic point of view if the technology were to
become ubiquitous.
Although heat detection devices remain relatively rare, 180 the
same is not true for GPS-enabled tracking devices or data
aggregation technologies. Quite to the contrary, GPS chips are in
“general public use” in our cellular phones, cars, computers, and
tablets. 181 Private purchases of GPS-enabled tracking devices are
also on the rise as the technology becomes cheaper and easier to
use. 182 As a consequence, for most of us, the aggregate of our daily
177

533 U.S. 26 (2001).
Id. at 40.
179
Id.
180
A recent search for thermal imaging devices revealed a price tag between
$2,000 and $27,000 per device. Thermal Imaging Cameras, Thermal Imaging
Scopes & More, OPTICSPLANET.COM, http://www.opticsplanet.com/heatseekers-termal-imagers.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). But see Daniel Cooper,
Modder Builds $150 Open-Source Thermal Imaging Camera To Help Insulate
His House, ENGADGET (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.engadget.com/2012/09/03/
iphone-thermal-imaging/ (reporting on a developing $150 thermal imaging app
for iPhone and Android devices).
181
See Freiwald, supra note 20, at 713–14.
182
David Joachim, Devices That Track Every Precious Need, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/technology/techspecial/09
178
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movements in public are actually exposed to private parties
through the very technology used by law enforcement officers in
Jones. 183 Given this state of affairs, it is hard to make the case for a
mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment based solely on social
expectations to the extent they are a function of common practice.
Even if such a case could be made with reference to present
realities, it would have little staying power because surveillance
and data aggregation technologies will only become more and
more endemic over time. 184
There is another, perhaps more promising, response to Judge
Sentelle’s mathematical objection. Rather than concede that we
have no expectations of privacy at all in the fragments of a mosaic,
advocates might argue that we actually do have some reasonable
expectations of privacy in our discrete public jaunts, but those
meager interests just do not to come anywhere close to
outweighing the significant law enforcement interests at stake in
observing citizens in public places. Although perhaps in tension
with some of the language of cases like Knotts, 185 adopting this
view would make the arithmetic work. It would also be consistent
with the Court’s account of the Fourth Amendment as requiring a
reasonable balance between law enforcement interests and
citizens’ privacy interests. 186 Practical problems would remain, of

postal.html (“Tracking devices that use the Global Positioning System have
become so compact and inexpensive that some people are using them routinely
to keep tabs on their most precious things.”).
183
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
184
See Orin S. Kerr, The Case Against the Mosaic Theory, USVJONES.COM
(June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-case-against-the-mosaictheory/ (warning that the mosaic theory cannot respond to changing
technologies). Assuming that the mosaic theory could be defended purely by
reference to practical expectations, advocates appear to run full force into
doctrinal problems, and particularly the problem of human surveillance. See
infra Part IV.B.
185
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another.”).
186
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 5.
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course, 187 but this account of the mosaic theory appears to resolve
the conceptual concern.
By far the most promising response to the argument that the
sum of nothings cannot be something, however, is to take seriously
the metaphor of the mosaic. It may well be true that the “sum of
an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero,” 188 but mosaic
advocates need not and do not make their case based on addition. 189
Quite to the contrary, their key claim is that the “whole” of one’s
movements in public “reveals more—sometimes a great deal
more—than does the sum of its parts.” 190 The mosaic theory is,
then, not an exercise in arithmetic. Rather, it recognizes that,
although a collection of dots is sometimes nothing more than a
collection of dots, some collections of dots, when assessed
holistically, are A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande
Jatte. 191 So, too, are our lives.
As Justice Sotomayor observed in Jones, a “precise,
comprehensive, record of a person’s public movements . . . reflects
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious and sexual associations.” 192 The tapestries of our lives are
by definition an aggregation of events and activities that, when
assessed discretely, or even iteratively, may have little
significance. When assessed holistically, however, these events
not only tell a detailed story of our activities and associations, they
may reveal who we are at a fundamental level and therefore expose
opportunities for manipulation and control. It may not take much.
For example, according to one recent study, researchers were able
to pierce the veil of anonymity cast over a body of locational data
187

See supra Part III.C.
United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
189
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(applying the mosaic theory to aggregated surveillance).
190
Id. at 558.
191
Georges Seurat, A Sunday on La Grande Jatte – 1884, ART INST. OF CHI.,
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/27992?search_id=1&index=0 (last
visited Jan. 4, 2013). The painting is an example of pointillism, which is a
technique defined by the use of individual dots to create an image. Id.
192
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
188
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and identify particular users by referencing as few as four “spatiotemporal points.” 193 The mosaic theory’s core claim, then, is not
that we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in flashing
moments, or even in meaningless arithmetic concatenations of
those events. Rather, mosaic theorists argue that we have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of our lives, and
therefore have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from constant,
indiscriminate, and pervasive surveillance. 194
Building out from this core, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Jones supports another important response to the arithmetic
objection.
Fourth Amendment privacy is not an ethereal
abstraction. To the contrary, as a constituent of rights bundled
together in the first eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 195
the negative rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment 196 secure the
space that is necessary to pursue the blessings of fundamental
liberty. As Justice Sotomayor points out, “Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive
freedoms.” 197 Only by providing substantial privacy protections
can we truly be at liberty to explore and pursue the good life as we
conceive it. Thus, Justice Sotomayor tells us, “GPS monitoring—
by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may
alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that
is inimical to democratic society.” 198

193

Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, César A. Hidalgo, Michel Verleysen &
Vincent D. Blondel, Unique in a Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP., Mar. 25, 2013, at 1376, available at
http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep01376/full/srep01376.html
194
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (concluding under the mosaic theory that
aggregated surveillance is outside the reasonable expectation of privacy).
195
U.S. CONST. amends. I–VIII.
196
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”).
197
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
198
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Although this holistic account of the mosaic theory may
answer Judge Sentelle’s mathematical concerns, it appears to run
full force into conceptual objections raised by Orin Kerr that the
mosaic engages a previously rejected diachronic account of the
Fourth Amendment. 199 Here, however, mosaic advocates have a
ready response:
The objection misunderstands the thesis.
Embracing a mosaic approach to assessing Fourth Amendment
privacy interests does not require taking an equally holistic view of
law enforcement conduct. That is, it may be true that officer
conduct during the course of an investigation does not constitute a
“search” when assessed discretely, or even in the aggregate, but,
nevertheless, may produce a mosaic of personal information that is
sufficiently expansive and detailed to implicate reasonable
expectations of privacy. There is no doubt that this shift in focus
from the conduct of law enforcement to the fruits of their
investigative efforts raises serious practical problems when
weighing Fourth Amendment interests. After all, officers naturally
want to be able to make prospective assessments of whether the
Fourth Amendment will apply so they will know how to proceed.
For now, however, it seems that a holistic framing of the mosaic
theory can meet the major conceptual objections, at least insofar as
it is treated as a way to understand Fourth Amendment interests
and harms. Whether and how the mosaic theory can be converted
into a useful set of practices and policies is a separate matter,
which we address below. 200
B. Responding to Doctrinal Objections
As we saw in the preceding section, the most persuasive way to
conceptualize the mosaic theory is to focus on what aggregations
of data reveal when assessed holistically rather than iteratively or
additively. So understood, the mosaic theory seems also to have
promising responses to the doctrinal objections discussed in
Part III.B.

199
200

See Kerr, supra note 32, at 315–20.
See infra Part IV.C.
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The first doctrinal challenge we saw in Part III came from the
public observation doctrine. How, critics wondered, can we square
the rule from Knotts—that police officers are free to make any
observations they care to from a place where they have a lawful
right to be—with the proposition that, if officers see too much,
then the Fourth Amendment is implicated? 201
Here again,
advocates might be tempted to lean on Judge Ginsburg’s
observation that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of
a month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively
nil.” 202 As we saw above, however, this line of response actually
threatens to maximize rather than minimize doctrinal damage.
After all, the chances that any of us is being observed by law
enforcement officers at any given time are also “effectively nil.” 203
Judge Ginsburg’s argument therefore seems to put at risk a host of
one-off surveillance practices that are routine for most police
officers, even if foreign and unexpected for many of their subjects.
At any rate, Judge Ginsburg’s distinction relies on a false
premise. Despite our contrary expectations, it is increasingly the
case that we are, in fact, being monitored much or most of the time
by a combination of law enforcement officers, governmental
regulators, and their legions of willing and unwilling private sector
201

See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (citing the Government’s argument that the
mosaic theory as applied to surveillance will hamper police investigations).
According to the Government, “[such a proposition] logically would prohibit
even visual surveillance of persons or vehicles located in public places and
exposed to public view, which clearly is not the law.” Brief of RespondentAppellee at 62, Maynard, Nos. 08-3030 and 08-3034 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2009),
2009 WL 3126569 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)).
202
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (“I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in
the sum of one’s public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).
203
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
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agents. 204 No matter how honestly held, then, the expectations that
Judge Ginsburg cites are, on the whole, not reasonable insofar as
reasonable expectations of privacy are indexed to reality. 205
All of this suggests that recognizing the mosaic theory would
require abandoning or significantly modifying the public
observation doctrine, 206 and perhaps the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test as well. 207 This is true even if the
mosaic theory focuses on the enhanced privacy interests implicated
by aggregations of data and information as a whole. First, mosaics
that trigger Fourth Amendment concerns can be aggregated in
sundry ways, including by using multiple investigative
techniques. 208 Without additional guidance, conducting traditional
surveillance for a day, a week, or a month might reveal too much.
Similarly, a targeted, but short technologically-enhanced
investigation might easily reveal enough to cross the threshold.
Second, given the increasing ubiquity of what Christopher
Slobogin has called “panvasive surveillance,” 209 defending a
mosaic theory appears to require treating the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test as proscriptive rather than descriptive.
Although attractive to many privacy advocates, that move would

204

See supra Part I.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that electronic
monitoring of conversations in public telephone constitutes a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment); id. at 353, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”).
206
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see also supra
Part III.B (discussing the public observation doctrine and the reduced
expectation of privacy while in public).
207
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
208
See Kerr, supra note 32, at 334 (using Jones as an example by recounting
that “[t]he government obtained cell phone location records, installed a public
surveillance camera, and watched the suspects in public, all in addition to
tapping phones and obtaining text messages”).
209
Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, MISS. L.J.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2158935.
205
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dramatically change the Fourth Amendment landscape, potentially
reopening questions once thought settled. 210
The only way for mosaic theorists to avoid falling off this
doctrinal cliff is to come forward with a clear evaluative test that
law enforcement officers can deploy prospectively to reliably
determine which investigative techniques they can employ, and to
what extent, before triggering Fourth Amendment requirements.
Thus, as we saw in the foregoing discussion of conceptual
issues, 211 the focus quickly turns to the practicalities. There is
simply no doubt that adopting a mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment will require modifying the public observation
doctrine. How much modification is required, and the type of
adjustment needed, will be a function of the test advocates adopt. 212
In contrast with the inevitable confrontation that mosaic
theorists must have with the public observation doctrine, any
conflict with the third party doctrine is entirely avoidable. It is by

210

See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is
designed to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Examples of previously settled questions that may
be affected by a shift to proscriptive analysis include whether a bus passenger
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage, whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in garbage, and whether a customer has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in banking records. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (“Thus, a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag
may be handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus employees
will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is
exactly what the agent did here.”); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 40 (1988) (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976) (“The checks are not confidential communications but
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”).
211
See supra Part IV.A.
212
Elsewhere, the authors propose and defend a “technology centered
approach” that resolves these practical problems. See Gray & Citron, supra note
35.
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now settled that the Fourth Amendment binds only state actors. 213
Thus, there is no constitutional barrier to private parties’ engaging
in surveillance activities that would be subject to Fourth
Amendment regulations if conducted by government officials. 214
Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion in Jones that the Court might need
to fundamentally reconsider the third party doctrine if it chooses to
embrace the mosaic theory 215 is therefore not motivated by
doctrinal necessity. Rather, it reflects practical concerns that the
privacy interests and harms identified by the mosaic theory will not
be fully vindicated unless private actors are also subject to
constraint or government agents are limited in terms of what
information they can gather through third parties.
This really involves two concerns. The first is that law
enforcement officers will simply circumnavigate the Fourth
Amendment by subpoenaing from private parties information that
the officers could not gather directly. The second is that
informational mosaics in the hands of private parties are no less
invasive and objectionable for being in private rather than state
hands. In response to both concerns, promoters of the mosaic
theory can simply maintain that worries about the absence of
practical protections for informational mosaics in light of the third
party doctrine are constitutionally gratuitous. They are also not
new. Similar arguments have been raised before the Court when it
has held the line on the third party doctrine. 216 In most of these
213

See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984) (holding that
private actors are not bound by the Fourth Amendment unless working as agents
of the state).
214
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“By contrast, if long-term monitoring can be accomplished without
committing a technical trespass—suppose, for example, that the Federal
Government required or persuaded auto manufacturers to include a GPS
tracking device in every car—the Court’s theory would provide no protection.”).
215
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
216
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (ruling that the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated when law enforcement places pen registers
on numbers called by telephone customers); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (“[T]he mere maintenance of the records by the banks under
the compulsion of the regulations invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right . . . .”);
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cases, the political branches have responded, imposing legal
limitations on the gathering, preservation, and sharing of
information from banks, 217 telephone companies, 218 and e-mail
providers. 219 The Court is free to exercise the same restraint should
it adopt the mosaic theory, and thereby avoid any entanglement
with the third party doctrine. Should it choose this more
parsimonious path, it would go a long way toward silencing many
mosaic critics. 220
C. Responding to Practical Concerns
The foregoing analysis suggests that mosaic theorists have
promising, if not always satisfying, responses to most of the
conceptual and doctrinal objections that have so far been raised
against the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. Many of
these responses are incomplete, however, in that they put
considerable pressure on how the practical details are resolved.
Therefore, whether the mosaic theory can provide a foundation for
elaborating Fourth Amendment interests in response to developed
and developing surveillance technologies is, in large part, a
function of how well the mosaic theory can be translated into a set
of coherent and workable rules and policies.

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (refusing to recognize Fourth
Amendment violation when private informant secretly taped conversations with
defendant).
217
See Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 31 U.S.C.) (requiring banks
to maintain secrecy of customer information except in certain circumstances).
218
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121-27 (2012)) (setting forth
requirements for law enforcement to obtain information about telephone
communications).
219
See id.
220
See Kerr, supra note 32, at 350 (criticizing mosaic theory and arguing that
the Court should exercise restraint in order to preserve space for the legislature
to regulate contemporary surveillance technologies); Erin Elizabeth Murphy,
The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure,
the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 485 (2013).
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As courts put the mosaic theory into practice, the first line of
challenges they will need to address are line-drawing problems.
How are officers and courts to determine whether a particular
informational mosaic contains enough information to implicate
Fourth Amendment rights? Does the quality of information in the
mosaic come into play, or is it merely the quantity? Does the
method of acquisition matter? How are police officers to know,
prospectively, whether the Fourth Amendment applies, when, and
what it demands? All of these are important questions that
ultimately feed back into the various conceptual and doctrinal
issues already discussed.
A good place for mosaic advocates to start is by pointing out
that these sorts of line-drawing problems are not unique to the
mosaic theory. Rather, they are endemic to the Fourth Amendment
itself. 221
The animating core of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. 222 Reasonableness, in turn, requires a balancing of
competing law enforcement and privacy interests. 223 It is therefore
no surprise that Fourth Amendment analysis is often more nuanced
than it is definitive, or that Fourth Amendment tests tend to
describe spectrums rather than bright lines. Take, for example, the
Court’s approach to probable cause, the threshold requirement that
must be met before officers can engage in searches for evidence.
Writing for the Court in Illinois v. Gates,224 then-Justice Rehnquist
tells us that “probable cause is a . . . practical, nontechnical”
standard and is “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
221

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971) (finding no
surprise and little weight in “the unstartling proposition that when a line is
drawn there is often not a great deal of difference between situations closest to it
on either side”).
222
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”).
223
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion.”).
224
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” 225 These are mushy
standards indeed, and no doubt produce a range of reasonable, but
conflicting, views among courts, 226 not to mention angst in the law
enforcement community. 227 Despite these difficulties, the Court
has yet to excuse officers or courts from responsibility for
“slosh[ing] [their] way through the factbound morass of
‘reasonableness.’ ” 228
It is hard to see how the line-drawing concerns raised by
mosaic critics are any more worrisome than the line-drawing
problems that are inherent to the Fourth Amendment. 229 Although
adopting the mosaic would likely lead to some growing pains, 230
there is no reason to think that courts and law enforcement officers
are incapable of growth. At any rate, fear of adjustment is no
reason to leave a constitutional right unprotected, much less
unrecognized. Of course, if assessing aggregations of information
and investigative procedures under a mosaic theory proves too
difficult using the case-by-case, fact-centered approach favored by
225

Id. at 231–32.
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I do not regard today's holding as some momentous departure, but
rather as merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been
with us for years . . . . There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our
minds, and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we take.”);
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1468 n.3 (1985) (describing United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1160
(D.C. Cir. 1981) rev’d, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), a case in which four dissenting
judges disagreed as to the appropriate standard for warrantless searches).
227
See Bradley, supra note 226, at 1468–69 (“The Court's failure to provide
such rules leads not only to the exclusion of evidence in cases involving the
guilty, but also to intrusions upon the rights of both the innocent and the guilty
by police who, faced with incomprehensibly complex rules either ignore them
or, in their efforts to follow them, make mistakes which lead to evidentiary
exclusion.”).
228
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
229
See Jim Harper, Escaping Fourth Amendment Doctrine After Jones:
Physics, Law, and Privacy Protection, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2011–2012, at 219,
244, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supremecourt-review/2012/9/scr-2012-harper.pdf (criticizing the “reasonable expectation
of privacy test” as overly subjective and confusing to courts).
230
See Kerr, supra note 32, at 347.
226
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the Court in other Fourth Amendment circumstances, 231 then there
is always the option of drawing bright lines. It would not be the
first time. For example, the Court has adopted a bright(ish) line
forty-eight-hour rule when assessing the reasonableness of
municipal policies governing probable cause hearings after
warrantless arrests. 232 It has also excused law enforcement officers
from the burden of showing independent probable cause, or any
other additional justification, when conducting searches incident to
arrest. 233 If it is necessary to do so in order to vindicate Fourth
Amendment rights, while avoiding thorny line-drawing problems,
the Court could follow a similar course after adopting a mosaic
theory.
In some of his recent work, Christopher Slobogin has
suggested just such a bright line approach to implementing the
mosaic theory. 234 Under his proposal, which is presented as a
model statute, any targeted “search”—defined succinctly as an
“effort by government to find or discern . . . information about a
specific person or circumscribed place” in connection with a
known criminal event—would be subject to increasing constraint
based on the aggregated time of that search. 235 Specifically,
targeted searches, conducted by any means that last longer than
231

See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 US 33, 39 (1996) (declining to impose a
bright line rule requiring officers to inform suspects that they are free to go
before pursuing a consensual interrogation); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 572 (1988) (declining to hold that investigatory pursuits always constitute
Fourth Amendment “seizures”).
232
Cnty. of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
233
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (allowing for a search of a
vehicle and the area in which an arrestee might lunge for a weapon). The Court
limited the bright line rule announced in Chimel in the context of searches of
cars incident to arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); see also
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) (holding that an officer can
search the vehicle that an arrestee recently exited); cf. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus
is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted.
Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is
probable cause to believe that it may be found.”)
234
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 16.
235
Id. at 17.
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forty-eight hours in the aggregate, would require a warrant; 236
searches that last between twenty minutes and forty-eight hours in
the aggregate would require a court order; 237 and searches that last
fewer than twenty minutes in the aggregate would only require
some good faith basis. 238
Targeted data searches, whether
conducted directly or through third parties, would be subject to
similar time constraints, with forty-eight hours again marking the
trigger point for the warrant requirement. 239
The great virtue of Professor Slobogin’s proposal, as with other
bright line approaches, is its clarity and ease of application. That
clarity comes with costs, of course, along some of the conceptual
and doctrinal dimensions discussed above. For example, Professor
Slobogin’s proposal runs full-force into doctrinal concerns based
on Knotts. In particular, he draws no distinction between human
surveillance and technologically enhanced surveillance. 240 Any
court that adopted his approach would therefore need to effect
pretty dramatic modifications to the public observation doctrine up
to, and likely including, overturning Knotts. After all, the
surveillance in Knotts lasted longer than twenty minutes, 241 which
under Professor Slobogin’s proposal would require a court order. 242
A court adopting Professor Slobogin’s approach would also
find itself confronted with conceptual and doctrinal objections
based on the traditional synchronic approach to evaluating the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of law enforcement conduct. 243
That is because Professor Slobogin chooses duration of
surveillance as the metric for measuring Fourth Amendment
trigger points. 244 Additionally, he assesses surveillance time
236

Id. at 25.
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 28.
240
Id. at 19.
241
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–80 (1983).
242
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 25.
243
See supra Part III.A. (describing the objections).
244
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 26 (“Rules based on duration are easier to
understand and abide by. While precise time divisions such as those used in this
provision are arbitrary in the sense that they apply regardless of how intrusive
237
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inclusively, 245 which also requires taking a diachronic, rather than
synchronic, view of law enforcement conduct.
Another difficulty with bright line approaches such as the one
Professor Slobogin describes is that, ironically enough, they often
ignore the actual mosaics of information aggregated by officers
during a challenged investigation. As a consequence, bright lines
draw boundaries that are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.
For example, with the benefit of sophisticated statistical analysis,
officers may be able to develop very revealing mosaics of personal
information by spot sampling personal data and GPS-enabled
tracking information. 246 As long as the aggregate of that sampling
does not add up to more than twenty minutes, however, there
would be no Fourth Amendment regulation if duration of
surveillance was used to describe the Fourth Amendment
boundary. 247 The same can be said for short-term, but potentially
revelatory, use of discrete surveillance technologies like drones. 248
Contrariwise, rather lengthy and unproductive human surveillance
the search actually is, time limitations as a method of defining constitutional
protections have a solid pedigree.”).
245
Id. at 25.
246
See Kerr, supra note 32, at 333 (discussing GPS software that can take
information at specific intervals). It is entirely within the realm of possibility
that police will soon have access to software that can cross-reference locational
data with other records, such as credit cards, which would give further insight
into a suspect’s actions. Cf. Josh Constine, Facebook Beta Launches New
Mobile Ad Network Using Your Data to Target You with Banner Ads in Other
Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/18/
facebook-mobile-ad-network/ (explaining Facebook’s plan to merge off-site ads
with biographical, locational, and social information provided by Facebook
users for a more targeted advertising system).
247
See Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test, USVJONES.COM (June 4, 2012),
http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-four-factor-test/
(finding
the
Alito
concurrence in Jones an incomplete solution).
248
See Marc Blitz, United States v. Jones – and the Forms of Surveillance
That May Be Left Unregulated in a Free Society, USVJONES.COM (June 4,
2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/united-states-v-jones-and-the-forms-ofsurveillance-that-may-be-left-unregulated-in-a-free-society/
(arguing
that
focusing only on long-term surveillance is an inadequate constitutional
protection).
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would require a warrant, 249 even if it ultimately produced nothing
close to the sort of informational mosaics that worried the
concurring Justices in Jones.
None of this is meant to condemn Professor Slobogin’s
proposal, of course. Rather, the point is that, precisely because
solutions for the conceptual and doctrinal challenges to the mosaic
lean so heavily on the practicalities of implementation, any
approach that is adopted will have conceptual and doctrinal
consequences. 250 The upshot is that compromises, conflict, and
adjustment are inevitable. As with all Fourth Amendment
questions, the test of success will be whether efforts to implement
the mosaic theory can accomplish a reasonable balance between
law enforcement goals and privacy interests. 251 Reaching that
balance has been a constant struggle since 1791. 252 There is no
reason to hope or expect that it will be any simpler in the coming
years as advocates and critics work through the potential and
consequences of a mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to advance debates after United
States v. Jones about the conceptual, doctrinal, and practical issues
that attend the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. The
discussion has not produced a clear conclusion. Rather, the goal
has been to elaborate the major objections raised against the
mosaic theory to provide guidance for mosaic advocates.
Although it is beyond the scope of the present Article to advance a
249

See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 27–28.
See id. at 36.
251
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”); supra note 156 and accompanying text.
252
The Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was first ratified in
1791. See 2 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 81 (2013); see M. Blane Michael, Reading the
Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 905, 907–19 (2010) (outlining the history of the Fourth Amendment and
how this history has informed its interpretation).
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mosaic-based proposal, the core insights that drive the theory
warrant that further development. 253 At its core, the mosaic theory
documents perfectly reasonable expectations that we will not be
forced to live in a surveillance state or to abide constant,
indiscriminate surveillance conducted by the Government or its
private proxies. 254 That this expectation has firm footing in the
Fourth Amendment we take to be a proposition that is
constitutionally unproblematic. 255 The devil may well be in the
details, but to the extent the mosaic theory is understood as a way
to conceptualize these privacy interests and corollary privacy
harms, the game is well worth the candle.

253

The authors develop and defend our own positive proposal elsewhere. See,
e.g., Gray & Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, supra note 36.
254
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
255
See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 12.
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